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1 Introduction
In June and July of 2010, the world learned about Stuxnet, a malicious com-
puter worm believed to be jointly created by American-Israeli cyber weapon
specialists.1 Experts have been convinced that Stuxnet was meant to sab-
otage the uranium enrichment facility at Natanz in Iran and its centrifuge
operational capacity but the damage spread to other units, too. It is believed
that most of the infected computers worldwide by Stuxnet have been in Iran.
Judging from such a cyber operation, Israel apparently preferred to mount
a cyber attack rather than a military strike on the nuclear facilities of Iran.
There is little downside to such an attack because it would be virtually im-
possible to prove who did it. Though the attack against Iran was a success
the same is not true of the corresponding attempts to cause damage to the
nuclear program of North Korea. It is conceivable that such strikes have been
planned and even attempted. With computerized instruments like Stuxnet,
the world has moved to a new area in warfare, the era of cyber war.2
Wars represent an exploitation of resources by destructive measures in
an inefficient non-Paretian way: they destroy value and lives. The digital
world has changed warfare not only in terms of the destructive power of the
weapons, but also by causing damage either directly to the efficient use of
the technology-dependent weapons of the opponent or by indirectly causing
1For details, see Sutherland (2012), for example.
2Cyber measures were also employed in the Georgian war in 2008 by the Russian mili-
tary though success was apparently rather limited. Recently, successful invasions in several
servers in military organizations abroad have taken place. Civilian targets have been sub-
ject to attacks over the years, including the Warshaw Stock Exchange and a German steel
-mill, both in 2014. Russians also launched in 2015 a cyber strike against the electric
system in Ukraine, causing substantial trouble for a large number of people. Defense
News reported in February 10, 2017 that the US Air Force has conducted a multitude of
cyber missions over the last year that have contributed to captured or killed terrorists.
According to written testimony provided to the House and Senate Armed Services com-
mittees this week, Air Force Vice Chief of Staff Gen. Stephen Wilson said, “The Air Force
conducted 4,000 cyber missions against more than 100,000 targets, disrupting adversaries
and enabling over 200 High Value Individual kill/capture missions.”
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paralyzing effects on the society at large. By its logic, a cyber attack repre-
sents a pre-emptive offensive action. Cyber measures often mean a remote
attack by digital technology with the purpose of causing damage to the so-
cial and/or military capability of an enemy. The cyber capability represents
an instrument prior to the war with conventional weapons. Modern warfare
may consequently be viewed as a multi-stage process in a new way.
In the development of military capabilities, enemies typically hide their
development plans. Once the success is confirmed, they may have an incen-
tive to signal their success to create deterrence. Though such signals may
result in counter actions by the enemy and may accelerate investment in
the military, they also serve as an information communication device of the
strength of the enemy!3
Viewed as a game, modern warfare appears to have several consecutive
stages. A war with conventional weapons tends to be preceded by a cy-
ber war. The potential of a cyber capability is unlimited. How strong is
the incentive to exploit the innovative success from the first-mover basis?
Several thoughts support the following propositions: (i) the cyber and the
conventional military capability of the defender is deteriorated if its cyber ca-
pability suffers from the attack, (ii) a cyber attack need not result in civilian
casualties, and (iii) the target cannot easily identify the attacking country.
Therefore, it is not trivial to initiate a counter-attack. For these reasons, the
threshold for a cyber attack may be low.
This paper develops a theory of conflict where countries invest both in cy-
ber technology and conventional weapons as complementary military inputs.
This leads to a sequential decision-making approach employing methods com-
monly used in economic research. As far as the author is aware, the current
paper is the first one using a formal economic approach in the analysis of
3The Soviet Union apparently wanted to hide the development of its nuclear weapons
in the 1950s until it obtained them. Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq wanted to confuse
the enemy (i.e., Iran), suggesting that it had built up mass destruction programs, though
it actually had not. The signals were misleading on purpose.
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cyber war.
Several questions will be addressed. What is the optimal investment in
cyber war technology in contrast to the conventional technology? Does the
incentive for a premature attack arise? Given that a cyber attack can be
directed to destroy the enemy’s ability to efficiently employ its conventional
weapons, what is the value of the first-mover advantage created by the cyber
capability?
The roadmap of the paper is as follows. Investment in cyber technology
is introduced into a standard model of conflicts in terms of the probability
of being victorious in warfare.4 Investment in cyber capability is considered
risky in terms of the outcome of the development effort. Moreover, the
outcome is private information for each country. The country that turns out
to be more successful finds that it has access to an option of initiating a cyber
attack against the enemy, but without knowing whether the enemy has been
successful in its rival development effort. In the latter case, a counterattack
by cyber measures is expected. After the cyber war stage, the countries
enter warfare with conventional weapons. It is a fundamental notion in the
model world of this paper that the war cannot be won by a cyber attack
only: conventional weapons are needed to capture the prize. A first-mover
advantage appears highly valuable. Expectations of the capability of the
enemy become crucial.
In the conventional theory of conflict, the return on the investment effort
in terms of the marginal increase in the probability of a victory is concave
and subject to diminishing returns. This will not hold true in the case of a
cyber investment. The remarkable property of the model shown here is that
the return on a cyber investment is convex. Convexity makes cyber tech-
nology a first-ranked military investment. It is shown that countries choose
4When referring to the standard approach, we resort to the approach suggested by
Tullock (1967, 1980) and subsequently elaborated by many, including Pe´rez-Castrillo and
Verdier (1992), Hirshleifer (1989), Chowdhury and Sheremeta (2011) and developed and
evaluated by Konrad (2009).
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to invest an equal amount of resources in their militaries even when their
cyber capabilities differ but less than in the absence of cyber war technology.
One of the key claims of the paper is that access to cyber technology limits
the international arms race with conventional weapons. Asymmetries in the
success of cyber programs create the option of a pre-emptive strike, reducing
the deterrence of war between countries by lowering the cost of war with
conventional weapons, though it invites less investment in an arms race.
2 Model of armament
2.1 Time line and stages: equilibrium with and without
deterrence
In the model world of this paper, there are two symmetric countries (players)
A and B which compete for a resource with value v > 0 using their military
power.5 The time line is as follows. In stage 0, both countries expecting
a military confrontation invest both in the conventional military capacity
and in the cyber capability. Those investments are denoted by (x, a) for the
country A and by (y, b) for the country B. In stage 1, the investment prob-
abilistically yields a cyber capability. When successful, the damage caused
by the cyber attack of, say country A, on the military strength of country B
is given by az with z > 0. Similarly, if country B is successful in the cyber
program, it can cause damage bz on country A. The damage thus depends
on the scale of investments (a,b).
The cost of the military program is given by the social cost of public funds.
It is assumed that the cost of investment in conventional weapons equals the
investments x and y.6 This section examines first the equilibrium in the base
5Access to a peaceful negotiation is exhausted. It is possible to think that the resource
is an outside one with badly defined property rights, but it can also be in the possession
of one of the countries encountering the conflict.
6A linear cost is needed for technical reasons if only to solve the model analytically
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line model of the conflict theory, the well-known Tullock (1967, 1980) model.
In the absence of a cyber technology, the Tullock-model predicts that the
probabilities of winning a (conventional) war between two countries P (A)
and P (B) are dictated by their relative military investments x and y,
P (A) =
x
x+ y
; P (B) =
y
x+ y
. (1)
The fundamental property of this formulation is that the marginal returns
on investment are strictly concave. For example, for country A (similarly for
country B),
∂P (A)
∂x
=
y
(x+ y)2
> 0,
∂2P (A)
∂x2
= − 2y
(x+ y)3
< 0. (2)
The value of the marginal unit of arms to a country is therefore related to
the amount of arms acquired by the enemy. We are thereby at the source of
explanation as to why the arms races arise! In the absence of cyber weapons
and abstracting from the cost of war, the expected returns from a warfare
are
E(piA) = P (A)v − x, E(piB) = P (B)v − y. (3)
Carrying out the maximization of the expected returns, the reaction func-
tions are
x = −y +√yv, y = −x+√xv. (4)
Then, the unique Nash equilibrium in investments in conventional weapons
for the optimal conventional investment. Access to such an explicit solution is helpful to
illustrate the mechanisms of the model. The cost of a cyber program is introduced below.
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is given by a pair (xN , yN) satisfying7
xN = yN =
v
4
. (5)
A high prize v justifies a high investment. Yet, it follows that both enemies
have the same probability of winning the war, P(A) = P(B) = 1/2. The
expected return from warfare is positive in the absence of a cost of war,
E(piA) = P (A)v − x = P (B)v − y = v/4 > 0.
Whether it is worthwhile to fight, the model should be adjusted for the costs
of a mutual war if it takes place. These costs apparently depend on the
military strength of the enemy. They will be denoted by C(y) and C(x) with
C ′(x) = C ′(y) > 0, C ′′(x) = C ′′(y) > 0. Therefore, the incentive conditions
for deterrence, adjusted for the costs of war, are
E(piA) = P (A)v − x− C(y) ≤ 0
E(piB) = P (B)v − y − C(x) ≤ 0.
It is a fascinating observation that deterrence is not only conditional
on the magnitude of the cost of war but also depends on the type of cost.
Suppose that the cost of war is quadratic, C(y) = 1
2
cy2. The deterrence
condition is v/4− 1
2
cv2/16, or c > 8/v. Unexpectedly, a high prize discourages
the outbreak of war. The reason is that a high prize creates an incentive to
have a large equilibrium investment in the conventional equilibrium not to
give lead to the enemy, which leads to a high mutual destruction power and
a high cost of war. The prize of war will not have such an impact if the cost
is linear in the destruction power of the enemy, C(y) = cy. In this case, the
7The second-order conditions are satisfied as P (A) is strictly concave in x and P (B)
in y.
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deterrence condition is simply c > 1.
Access to a cyber attack raises new questions. First, how much is it
worthwhile to invest in conventional weapons if countries can resort to cyber
instruments? Second, does the answer depend on the differences in cyber
capability? Third, is it always the case that a cyber war is followed by a war
with conventional weapons? Does the threshold to a cyber war differ from
that of a conventional war? These are the issues to be analyzed next and
some of the answers turn out to be unexpected.
2.2 Investment in arms with expected success in a cyber
program
We now introduce cyber capability as a new warfare instrument. Suppose
first that both countries are planning their investment programs in conven-
tional weapons, x and y, expecting to be equally successful in creating the
cyber destructive power, z > 0. Suppose that the deterrence condition will
not be satisfied in stage 1 and that both expect to launch a cyber attack
against each other. Subsequently, in stage 2, they expect to be engaged in a
mutual war with conventional weapons. The ex ante expected returns from
warfare then are
E(piA) =
x(1− bz)
x(1− bz) + y(1− az)v − x− c(a)− C(y) (6)
E(piB) =
y(1− az)
y(1− az) + x(1− bz)v − y − c(b)− C(x). (7)
The social costs of the cyber investments have been denoted by c(a) and
c(b). The following strong result is available:
Proposition 1. (Neutrality of cyber). If countries expect to have access
to equally effective cyber capabilities, their cyber capabilities are neutral in
respect to the optimal investment in conventional weapons.
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Proof. Solving for the Nash equilibrium from equations (6) and (7) under
condition az = bz, one can see immediately that the cyber capability does
not interfere with the optimal investments x and y. QED
The outcome of such a symmetric game was given above by (5). The
symmetric case, however, is destroyed if one of the countries expects to be
superior in creating the cyber capability. Suppose that it is country A while
both expect that country B will not be able to create such a capability. It
holds
E(piA) =
x
x+ y(1− az)v − x− c(a)− C(y), (8)
E(piB) =
y(1− az)
y(1− az) + xv − y − c(b)− C(x). (9)
An unexpected result follows,
Lemma 1. In a Nash equilibrium, countries with a superior and inferior cy-
ber ability have incentives to invest an equal amount in conventional weapons,
but less relative to the case when cyber technology is not expected to be avail-
able for either of them.
Proof. Solving for the Nash equilibrium, the optimal investments in the
conventional weapons are
xC = yC =
(1− az)v
(2− az)2 <
v
4
. (10)
The inequality follows from that when z = 0, xC = yC = v/4. Moreover, for
z > 0,
∂
[
(1− az)v/(2− az)2] /∂z = −a2zv/(2− az)3 < 0. (11)
QED
This result follows from the strategic interaction between the countries
and from the fact that the marginal value of the armament for a country is
positively related to the strength of its enemy, cf. (2). The country with
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Figure 1: Nash equilibria in the absence of and under cyber capability
a superior cyber capability can economize in its investment in the arms as
it knows that part of the military capacity of its enemy can be destroyed.
Furthermore, even knowing that part of it is expected to be destroyed the best
response of the enemy with the more limited cyber capability is to invest the
same amount as the country with the superior cyber technology. However,
the latter country has a greater probability of winning the war
P (A) =
1
2− az >
1− az
2− az = P (B) (12)
and a greater expected return from a war
E(piA) =
1
2− az v− c(a)−C(y) > 0, E(piB) =
1− az
2− az v− c(b)−C(x). (13)
Once the enemy invests less, so does the other country. There is a mu-
tual cutback in the armament. This does not eliminate the wars nor is the
deterrence more likely. Unexpectedly and in contrast, it makes the wars less
costly and less destructive, but therefore more likely. Thus,
Proposition 2. A succesful cyber program reduces deterrence by lowering
9
the cost of war in conventional weapons.
Country B therefore ends up investing the same amount as country A even
knowing that its probability of winning the war will be smaller. To make sure,
the marginal values of the armaments for both countries are equalized in the
Nash equilibrium with the marginal costs, ∂P (A)v/∂x = x, ∂P (B)v/∂y = y.
Next, we report a key implication of the model,
Lemma 2. The return on cyber investment is strictly convex in a.
Proof. Taking the partial derivatives of the winning probability in (6), it
holds for country A,
∂
[
x(1− bz)
x(1− bz) + y(1− az)
]
/∂a =
xyz(1− bz)
[x(1− bz) + y(1− az)]2 > 0
∂2
[
x(1− bz)
x(1− bz) + y(1− az)
]
/∂a2 =
2xy2z2(1− bz)
[x(1− bz) + y(1− az)]3 > 0
and similarly for country B. It follows that both countries have a strong
incentive to acquire the destructive cyber capability, hoping to enhance the
probability of winning the war with the conventional weapons in the final
stage.
3 Cyber attack as an option
3.1 Uncertainty of the success of the enemy
Following the cyber investments, there are four possible outcomes from the ex
ante perspective. With probability pp, both succeed in their cyber programs.
With probability p(1-p), one succeeds while the other does not, and with
probability (1-p)(1-p) neither succeeds. A success is private information
and unobservable. A cyber attack leads to a counter attack if the other
country has also succeeded. A first-mover strike is plausible when the success
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probability p is low because if A has succeeded, it expects that B has been
successful with only a low probability. This suggests that the probability of a
first-mover attack may be high when the ex ante success probability is small.
Yet, Proposition 2 above states that success in cyber investment lowers the
war threshold, increasing the risk of a war. A question of interest is whether
it is possible that the cyber capability facilitates a first-mover strike but
whether there are conditions under which it can reduce the likelihood of a
conventional war? Why did Israel limit action against Iran in cyber weapons
instead of initiating a conventional war?8
Consider now the case where a country, say country A knows that it has
been successful in completing the cyber program but faces uncertainty of the
success of its enemy. In stage 1, it has launched a cyber attack, knowing that
the enemy will retaliate with a cyber counter-attack followed (apparently) by
warfare with conventional weapons. By this stage, all investments (x, y, a, b)
were undertaken and bygone. The incentive condition for exercising the
option of initiating a cyber attack in stage 1 to be followed by the warfare
in conventional weapons is given by
E(piA) = pE (piA0) v + (1− p)E (piA1) v − C(y(1− az)) ≥ 0 (14)
where
E (piA0) =
x(1− bz)
x(1− bz) + y(1− az) =
x
x+ y
E (piA1) =
x
x+ y(1− az)
What is the value of the option for a cyber strike and is it always worth-
while to exercise this option? How much is it optimal to invest ex ante in a
cyber program by a country that expects to be superior in the cyber capabil-
8In the Stuxnet attack against Iran, no war with conventional weapons took place.
Recall that Israel had, however, undertaken a pre-emptive strike on the nuclear facility of
Iraq in Osirak in 1981.
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ity? What are the conditions for a country with a superior cyber capability
to abstain from warfare with conventional weapons given that it committed
to a cyber strike in the first place?
The condition for exercising the attack option under uncertainty can then
be stated in terms of the success probability of the enemy from (13),
p ≤ p¯ = E (A1)− C(y(1− az))
E (A1)− E (A0)
(
1
v
)
. (15)
Proposition 3. A low success probability of the cyber R&D encourages exer-
cising the cyber attack option by a successful country to be followed by warfare
in conventional weapons,
This result is logical: a country that has been able to acquire the cyber
capability knows that the enemy has a similar capability but with a small
probability. Moreover, while the cost of war reduces the critical probability
and discourages exercising the option (and potentially unjustifying the at-
tack), this cost is reduced by a successful cyber attack. A high value of the
prize of winning the war, v, unexpectedly reduces the critical probability.
Consider next the case
CA(y) > CB(x).
Then,
Corollary 1. It is sufficient for a country with a superior cyber capability
launch a cyber strike against its enemy, but to abstain from warfare with
conventional weapons that the cost of war for country A is sufficiently greater
than the cost for country B.
“Sufficiently greater” means here that E (piA) < 0 while E (piB) > 0.
It follows from the convexity property above: a cyber capability can be
viewed as representing an option of destroying the enemy’s capacity and an
investment in cyber represents an investment in a call option. The view
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of options therefore becomes helpful for the current analysis. The outcome
of the risky R&D program represents the underlying risky asset analogous
to a call option in the theory of finance. This option can be acquired by
investing in the uncertain R&D project and may be worth exercising if the
country has been successful in its risky R&D project and if the cost of war is
tolerable. Ever since Black and Scholes, one of the basic messages of option
pricing has been that a high risk makes the option valuable. The question
is, how worthwhile it is to expand the cyber program given that it is subject
to increasing costs? Moreover, if it turns out to be successful, what is the
value of the attack option that a success creates?
The value of the option for country A created by its asymmetric success
in its cyber program is given by the difference between the expected return
from the war and the value of war in the absence of the cyber capability,
V = max [0, V (a)− V (0)] (16)
where
V (a) =
x
x+ y(1− az)v − C(y(1− az))− x
V (0) =
x
x+ y
v − C(y)− x.
Notice that
x
x+ y(1− az) >
x
x+ y
and that
C(y(1− az)) < C(y)
making the cyber attack option valuable. The option has no value when both
countries or neither country has succeeded. We have both countries investing
in the cyber program from the start - the technology frontier has made it
feasible and there is no point in delaying. The return on cyber investment is
convex; both countries prefer to have az and bz equal to 1, but this is a case
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where the countries are capable of making the enemy completely helpless
with no military strength. Such a highly unrealistic case is eliminated by an
assumption which is now introduced,9
Assumption 1. 1− az > 0, 1− bz > 0.
3.2 Optimal investment in cyber: the superior country
Consider a case where one of the countries, say A, ex ante expects for sure
to be superior in its cyber program.10 Ask: how much will it optimally
invest in the cyber technology? To analyze the optimal cyber investment
of the superior country, introduce a convenient notation, E[piA(a)] = f(a).
The function f(a) is continuously differentiable everywhere, in particular on
[0, 1/z]. The optimal investment in cyber of a country which expects to be
superior then solves
a∗ = arg maxa f(a) =
x
x+ (1− az)yv − x− c(a)− C(y(1− az)). (17)
To have the solution for the optimal cyber as a finite interior investment
choice, its cost of investment must be sufficiently convex in the relevant
region of a.11 With no loss generality, is is then convenient to let the cost be
given by
c(a) =
1
3
ca3, c > 0. (18)
9Even the “star war” during the Reagan administration in the USA was too expensive
to be accomplished.
10If both expect to become equally successful, the case was analyzed above.
11While there is a well-functioning international market for conventional weapons with
publicly available information on the market prices, no such market exists for the spe-
cific human capital required to establish a cyber program. Training a new generation of
electronic engineers is time-consuming and expensive.
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To find the extreme values, evaluate the first-order condition f ′(a) = 0
arriving at equality between the marginal revenue and the marginal cost,
MRa =
xyzv
[x+ (1− az)y]2 , MCa = ca
2.
The first-order condition can thus be stated as a fourth-order equation in a,
xyzv
c
= [x+ (1− az)y]2 a2.
It must thus have four roots. Taking the square roots,√
xyzv
c
= [x+ (1− az)y] a.
As the left-hand side is positive, only the plus sign qualifies on the right-
hand side. The candidates for the optimal cyber investment therefore satisfy
a second-order algebraic equation
yza2 − (x+ y)a+
√
xyzv
c
= 0. (19)
There are two solution candidates,
a∗ =
(x+ y)±
√
(x+ y)2 − 4yz√xyzv
c
2yz
.
It has to be assumed that the roots are real,
Assumption 2.
(x+ y)2 − 4yz
√
xyzv
c
≥ 0.
This assumption can be defended when the cost c is sufficiently “large”.
Notice that the case az ≥ 1 is excluded by Assumption 1. The roots satisfying
az < 1 are more interesting.
As there are two roots, one has to choose. Of the candidates, only the
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smaller one, a∗1 < a
∗
2, qualifies as a maximum; the other solution has to be a
minimum. A graphical illustration is illuminating.12 Note that at the origin
with a = 0, MRa > 0 while MCa = 0. At a low level of a, the MRa−curve
is therefore above the MCa−curve. Thus, of the two extreme values it is the
maximum that is located at a = a∗1 while the minimum is located at a = a
∗
2.
There are two points of intersection of the MRa− and the MCa−curves given
by the roots. 13
Stating formally the second-order condition for the maximum,
f ′′(a) =
xy2z2v
[x+ (1− az)y]3 − ca < 0. (20)
The parameter space is rich enough to find combinations which satisfy such
a requirement.
To summarize the key finding in the current section,
Proposition 4. When a country expects to acquire a superior cyber capability
there is a unique maximum solution for the optimal cyber investment.
Proof. Above.
The following comparative static effects
∂a∗i
∂v
> 0,
∂a∗i
∂c
< 0
are as expected: the incentives to invest in the cyber technology are posi-
tively related to the prize of winning the war, and negatively to the cost of
investment.
12Whether to initiate a war or not is a separate decision and is dictated by whether
the expected total return f(a) is positive or negative at the optimal choice of the military
investments.
13It follows that the smaller solution, a∗1, is stable while the greater one, a
∗
2, is unstable.
A small deviation from a∗1 leads to a process which induces the solution to move towards
a∗1 while a small deviation from a
∗
2 induces the solution to move further away from a
∗
2.
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Figure 2: Optimal cyber program by a superior country
The comparative statics with respect to the damage z, however, has two
opposite effects. The explanation goes as follows. The damage effect natu-
rally raises the return on the cyber investment. However, there is a break to
the scale of the cyber program as it is costly, and the more effective it is, the
smaller the threat of the military capacity of the enemy.
We observe the additional result that a high investment in the conven-
tional military both by a country and by its enemy (x,y) justify a high invest-
ment in the cyber capability of the technologically more advanced country.
In this sense, the two military instruments are complements rather than sub-
stitutes.
4. Final remarks
The current paper has established some key regularities concerning modern
warfare. It was shown that an asymmetric success in a cyber program creates
an option for a first-mover attack, yet reduces international arms races in
conventional weapons, but nevertheless increases the likelihood of a war,
reducing deterrence.
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As many believe, the attacks against the Iranian nuclear stations by the
Stuxnet virus were undertaken by Israel. Why did the country abstain from
an attack with conventional weapons? One reason might be that it was
possible to carry out the attack secretly. This makes the cost of a cyber
attack smaller than by resorting to conventional weapons where the cost
should be viewed as including the international response. Another reason
may be that resorting to a pre-emptive cyber attack provided extra time and
potential access to new options in the long-lasting conflict. Anyway, Stuxnet
has made cyber war a reality in modern warfare.
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